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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/15/31DEBATE Open Access“Nudge” in the clinical consultation – an
acceptable form of medical paternalism?
Ajay Aggarwal1,2*, Joanna Davies3 and Richard Sullivan1Abstract
Background: Libertarian paternalism is a concept derived from cognitive psychology and behavioural science.
It is behind policies that frame information in such a way as to encourage individuals to make choices which are
in their best interests, while maintaining their freedom of choice. Clinicians may view their clinical consultations
as far removed from the realms of cognitive psychology but on closer examination there are a number of striking
similarities.
Discussion: Evidence has shown that decision making is prone to bias and not necessarily rational or logical,
particularly during ill health. Clinicians will usually have an opinion about what course of action represents the
patient’s best interests and thus may “frame” information in a way which “nudges” patients into making choices
which are considered likely to maximise their welfare. This may be viewed as interfering with patient autonomy
and constitute medical paternalism and appear in direct opposition to the tenets of modern practice. However,
we argue that clinicians have a responsibility to try and correct “reasoning failure” in patients. Some compromise
between patient autonomy and medical paternalism is justified on these grounds and transparency of how these
techniques may be used should be promoted.
Summary: Overall the extremes of autonomy and paternalism are not compatible in a responsive, responsible and
moral health care environment, and thus some compromise of these values is unavoidable. Nudge techniques are
widely used in policy making and we demonstrate how they can be applied in shared medical decision making.
Whether or not this is ethically sound is a matter of continued debate but health care professionals cannot avoid
the fact they are likely to be using nudge within clinical consultations. Acknowledgment of this will lead to greater
self-awareness, reflection and provide further avenues for debate on the art and science of clinical communication.
Keywords: Nudge, Libertarian paternalism, Communication, Framing, Shared decision making, Medical consultationBackground
Helping individuals to make decisions which promote
their own welfare, without limiting their freedom of
choice is one of the hallmarks of “libertarian paternal-
ism” (LP) or “asymmetric paternalism” [1,2].
Paternalism is often considered a serious threat to the
autonomy and choice of an individual, and is associated
with perceived authoritarian policies such as prohibition
[3]. However LP aims to provide a framework where in-
dividuals make decisions which benefit themselves and* Correspondence: ajayaggarwal@doctors.org.uk
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orsociety, whilst still maintaining a range of available op-
tions. In other words by changing the “choice architec-
ture” for decision making, individuals can be “nudged”
into making the right choices [4].
The premise for this approach is based on our under-
standing of behavioural economics [5] which has charac-
terised decision making processes and the biases which
may impact on rational decision leading to “reasoning
failure” [6]. This can result in choices that negatively
impact on welfare, [7] which is particularly relevant to
medical practice where patients are often required to
weigh up risks of survival, toxicity and quality of life
when making treatment decisions. Under these circum-
stances patients may also be influenced by an array of
emotions such as fear and grief [6].ral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited.
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particular treatments do not come from a neutral evalu-
ation of risks and benefits but rather from a perception of
hope even when faced with a high likelihood of major tox-
icity and low benefit [8]. Further inconsistencies in decision
making may arise from previous experiences, particular if
these have been unpleasant [6]. Such findings are entirely
in line with Prospect Theory where decisions made under
conditions of gains and losses are very different, and not
subject to a state of maximising personal utility [9].
During the 1960’s and 70’s there was a considerable
backlash towards medical paternalism, with a move to-
wards “whole person” medicine [10]. The onus shifted to
the individual to take responsibility for decisions relating
to their health needs. Cassileth [11] pithily summarised
this new era, “The current approach derives from a new
emphasis on individual responsibility and the right to
control one’s own living and dying. Informed consent,
open communication, full disclosure and patient infor-
mation are expressions of the contemporary focus”.
Informed decision making requires the provision of com-
prehensive and objective information [12]. However pa-
tients may struggle with probabilities, over-estimating their
level of risk of disease and the potential benefits of treat-
ment [13]. It has been argued that too many options can
have negative consequences resulting in individuals using
heuristics (rules of thumb) to counter the numerous
choices on offer, resulting in suboptimal decisions [14]. In-
dividuals may suffer from “myopia” where they are not able
to imagine decisions that will impact them in the future,
specifically not anticipating how their preferences may
change over time [15]. An extension of this phenomenon
is known as “hyperbolic discounting” where one places a
disproportionate weight on the present, relative to future
costs and benefits [16]. An example would be an individual
continuing with excessive or unhealthy eating habits given
that the effects of obesity are delayed, but food consump-
tion results in immediate gratification. People also prefer
the “status quo”, in other words their current situation over
an alternative, even if superior options exist [17]. This iner-
tia effect has been termed the the default bias [17,18].
In clinical practice doctors appreciate these challenges
and apply many of the principles of LP in the process of
shared and informed decision making. Here we explore
whether doctors are justified in “framing” the discussion
and delivery of information to achieve what their profes-
sional judgement would consider the optimal choice for
the patient, or is this indeed a case of paternalism and
thus a threat to patient autonomy?
Discussion
The following hypothetical case scenarios provide exam-
ples of the use of “nudge” in a clinical consultation and
will be used to explore the issues involved.Consultation A
Eve is a 42 year old lady with a node positive, Grade III
hormone resistant breast cancer that has been fully ex-
cised. The National Institute of Health and Care Excel-
lence (NICE) would recommend that she proceed with
adjuvant chemotherapy followed by radiotherapy [19].
She does not wish to have chemotherapy due to witnes-
sing her mother’s bad experiences during chemotherapy
for lung cancer. She is particularly concerned about hair
loss, infection and the impact on her quality of life.
The doctor explains that the treatments for lung can-
cer and breast cancer do not utilise the same drugs and
thus the side effects are different. Fatigue is expected but
this may not impact on her day to day activities with
some patients able to continue working whilst on treat-
ment. The main reason for offering chemotherapy is to
prevent recurrent disease, which if it did occur would be
incurable. Her risk of relapse is 80% without treatment.
Chemotherapy doubles her chance of being alive in
10 years time.
The aim would be to treat side effects such as nausea
and vomiting with medication. She has an 85% likeli-
hood of not having any serious infection [20]. The doc-
tor explains that her risk of alopecia is high, but her hair
is highly likely to grow back on completion of treatment.
The patient explains that she is confused, and also upset
given the memories of her mother’s suffering. The doc-
tor advises the patient to avoid making any immediate
decisions. He provides Eve with written information on
chemotherapy and arranges a review in one week’s time.Consultation B
Jennifer is a 60 year old lady with a node negative, Grade
I hormone sensitive, breast cancer that has been fully ex-
cised. NICE recommend treatment with adjuvant radio-
therapy and anti-oestrogen hormonal treatment for 5 years
[19]. However, Jennifer sees chemotherapy as an essential
part of cancer treatment in order to give her the best
chance of cure. She bases this opinion on her discussions
with other patients who have had breast cancer, all of
whom had chemotherapy which they tolerated well.
The doctor explains she has a very high chance of
cure. The benefit from chemotherapy is minimal, specif-
ically if 100 women with her cancer were treated with
chemotherapy, 99 patients would receive no benefit. In-
formation regarding the toxicity of treatment is provided
which includes severe sickness (20%), infection requiring
hospitalisation (15%), hair loss (85%) and fatigue which
is experienced by the majority of patients [20]. The pa-
tient is still adamant she wishes to have chemotherapy.
The doctor explains that her risks of complications out-
weigh the benefits and that she would be at undue risk
of toxicity and in some cases death. It is recommended
Aggarwal et al. BMC Medical Ethics 2014, 15:31 Page 3 of 6
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/15/31that she attend in one week’s time after reviewing the in-
formation provided.Consultation review
The scenarios described are two extremes but demon-
strate medical consultations in which the pros and cons
of treatment are discussed. Firstly one can see the
impact of frame effects. This refers to the different
methods by which logically equivalent information can
be conveyed or presented and has been shown to influ-
ence decision making [21]. The reference point of Eve in
scenario A is her prior negative experience of chemo-
therapy after witnessing her mother’s treatment. An
attempt to shift her from this occurred when the differ-
ences between the two diseases and their treatments
were highlighted. The toxicity data was positively
framed by emphasising that the risk of not developing
a serious infection was 85%. Although fatigue may be
an issue, attempts were made to change her reference
point to the “norm” by explaining that some patients
are able to work during treatment, which is likely to
alter her interpretation of the debilitating effect of
chemotherapy.
By comparison, negative framing was used to explain
the rates of toxicity including alopecia and infection in
scenario B. It was also used to convey the message about
the poor efficacy of chemotherapy with 99/100 having
no benefit compared to 1/100. Describing negatively
framed risk information numerically has a greater im-
pact on treatment choices than a verbal risk description
[22]. In case A, her risk of sickness was described as
high and in scenario B, a figure of 20% was used to con-
vey the same information.
Prospect Theory suggests that highlighting perceived
losses associated with inaction are more likely to motiv-
ate action in risky situations than perceived gains [6,9].
In Scenario A, it was explained that inaction (i.e. a
choice of no chemotherapy) would result in an 80% risk
of relapse. Loss framing has been shown to have a
greater impact than positive framing, particular when
looking at screening uptake [23]. In scenario A, the
method of presenting the additional benefit of chemo-
therapy was presented as a relative risk which has been
shown in trials to have a greater impact than presenta-
tion of absolute risks [24].
Another nudge strategy in these vignettes involved the
regulation of timing decisions [25]. Both patients were
asked to consider their options in light of the new infor-
mation provided during the consultation. This allows
personal reflection and also a resetting of their frame of
reference which may be influenced by prior negative or
positive experiences. This “cooling off” period is there-
fore designed to optimise patient choice [4].Analysis
Critics of nudge policies suggest that they do not unbias
individual’s decision making, in other words correct the
causes of reasoning failure, but rather utilise these biases
to trick them into a certain decision [26]. They contend
that the use of such mechanisms impacts on an individ-
ual’s autonomy as they are not fully in control of their
actions, and there should be greater transparency [27].
Freedom of choice is a core tenet of the LP philosophy
however there remains incongruity between the “nom-
inal freedom of choice” and the “effective freedom of
choice.” For example auto-enrolled opt out schemes
(e.g. organ donation) result in only a small proportion of
people leaving the scheme, due to exploitation of their
status quo bias [28].
It may be that using paternalism and autonomy as the
two overriding, principles is overly simplistic. It has been
suggested that it is perhaps more accurate to consider
nudge in terms of “manipulation,” [29] which describes
someone influencing a situation in order to achieve a de-
sired outcome, without making it apparent that this is
occurring. Manipulation, does suggest that the motiv-
ation is personal gain and the contrast here is that in
these examples the manipulation of information is be-
lieved to be for the patient’s benefit. However, irrespect-
ive of motivation and outcome, the technique will be the
same and this raises some interesting ethical issues and
reminds us that while in health policy these techniques
appear to have been used with good intentions there is
nothing stopping the same techniques being used for
bad ones.
An example would be subliminal messaging in adver-
tising where the motivation is profit yet the method still
relies on taking advantage of a predictable human behav-
ioural response. Thaler and Sunstein defend equating
nudge with manipulation by arguing that one difference
between the two lies in the fact that nudge techniques
should be transparent and publicly defensible [25]. If we
apply this to the clinical consultations in our article the
doctor is giving their opinion openly however is not ne-
cessarily being transparent about the way in which he is
choosing to deliver information. The word manipulation
itself is certainly more emotive and arguably has more
negative connotations than paternalism, which implies
protection and care, principles which sit more comfort-
ably in the ethos of healthcare.
However, perhaps health care professionals are being
paternalistic to each other by shying away from the
concept of manipulation and hiding behind the more
acceptable defence of paternalism rather than openly ac-
knowledging the use of nudge in clinical encounters. An
example might be if the clinician acknowledged to the
patient that they were delivering the information in a
specific way; for example by saying “I am giving you the
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think this is the best course of action.” If the motivation
is for the patients benefit and the clinician is open about
the way he or she delivers information then claims of
manipulation can be refuted and patient autonomy
maximised.
This brings us to autonomy. If we were to look at au-
tonomy in its purest form rationality does not come into
it. Only the individual to whom that decision relates can
truly appreciate their own values and preferences and
thus the best interests that will be unique to them.
Therefore any attempt to influence this will result in a
decision that is not truly in their best interests. However
being a patient with a potentially life threatening condi-
tion puts a considerable strain on their ability to process
information. The reasons and evidence for this are dis-
cussed elsewhere in the paper and this raises the ques-
tion whether it is the duty of a doctor to recognise and
correct reasoning failure in their patients? If so would
this be considered a paternalistic act?
Autonomy is central to patient care and a patient is
entitled to make seemingly unwise decisions or refuse
life sustaining treatment so long as they have the mental
capacity to do so. For patients deemed not to have cap-
acity to make specific decisions statute law allows health
care professionals to make those decisions in the pa-
tient’s best interests. (Mental Capacity Act 2005) How-
ever, Komrad argues that illness represents a temporary
loss of patient autonomy mediated by vulnerability, fear,
loss of self esteem, and physical or mental incapacity. As
a result to some degree paternalistic input is justified to
restore an individual’s autonomy [30].
Medical training aims to equip clinicians with appro-
priate skills to deal holistically with the complexities of
medical practice. Medical decision making should be a
collaborative process between patient and health care
professional. However, that clinicians should not have an
opinion on what constitutes a preferred treatment op-
tion for their patients defies the objectives of their train-
ing and the development of clinical judgement. Of
course patient choice is paramount, but it is important
to note that to date medical professionals maintain the
right not to give treatments that are not beneficial, or
even harmful, even if this is perceived as directly inter-
fering with patient autonomy, although clearly the aim
should be to avoid situations with such conflicting opin-
ions. This position has been upheld by case law (R on
the application of Burke v The General Medical Council
[2005] EWCA Civ 1003) and in the recent case of Mr
James [31] and is detailed in the General Medical Coun-
cil’s ethical guidance [32].
If we look again at scenario B; despite her requests,
the administration of chemotherapy is likely to cause
harm and even be potentially fatal without any clearbenefit and seems to be unequivocally not to be in her
best interests. The patient’s reasoning failure should
not allow her to insist on a treatment which is frankly
harmful even if this may be considered to be “overtly
paternalistic.” Collaborative working is vital, but funda-
mentally there is a duty of care and responsibility to pa-
tients which cannot be absolved.
A potential criticism to this argument is that it is naive
to think that it is only patients who are subject to exter-
nal influences. Doctors themselves, despite their train-
ing, are human and are certainly not immune from
biases and this has been well documented [33]. Clearly
both patients and clinicians will be subject to any num-
ber of biases related to personal factors. However in
addition to these, patients may be expected to encounter
more predictable biases related to their adverse health
status. These are more relevant to the concept of nudge
as they allow some prediction of a typical behavioural re-
sponse in a given situation.
To promote informed decision making, autonomy and
effective collaboration, information sharing is crucial
[34]. However, the question arises as to whether all pa-
tients strive for full information and control over choice,
or whether some prefer guidance. Is the role of the doc-
tor just to provide information? The evidence suggests
that a patient’s desire for information acts as a proxy for
building a trusting relationship with their doctor [35].
There is little evidence that the information, although
valued, informs actual choices [36]. Other patients do
not necessarily wish to have information and complain
of overload, and the notion that all information is uni-
versally positive has been challenged [37]. For example
patients with prostate cancer describe regrets and isola-
tion when deciding on the appropriate course of curative
treatment, given there is not a clear superiority between
options. However, patients are still encouraged to take
responsibility for their treatment choice in a field where
optimum management is unclear [38].
The value of shared decision making models has also
been questioned [39]. Specifically the model defines both
parties as equals, however both physicians and patients
have defined their relationship as “asymmetric” [40].
Other elements of a doctor-patient relationship are hope
and care [41], which are intuitive responses by the health
professional to the needs of the patient. This in itself
represents a desire from both patients and doctors for
the patient to be offered some degree of protection [42].
Summary
Cognitive psychology and behavioural science have pro-
vided a framework for understanding key processes in
patient decision making. Nudge techniques are widely
used in policy making and we have demonstrated how
they can be applied in shared medical decision making.
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clinicians have developed techniques for countering rea-
soning failure in the clinical setting. Whether these are
classified as overt “nudge techniques” or soft paternalism
the aim is for the doctor and patient to work in close
collaboration to achieve decisions that are in the pa-
tient’s best interests. Collaboration should allow preser-
vation of freedom of choice but at the same time not
result in the professional forgoing their clinical responsi-
bility or professional judgement. Overall the extremes of
autonomy and paternalism are not compatible in a re-
sponsive, responsible and moral health care environ-
ment, and thus some compromise of these values is
unavoidable. Whether or not using nudge is ethically
sound is a matter of opinion but health care profes-
sionals cannot shy away from the fact they are likely to
be using it within clinical practice. Acknowledging this
will hopefully lead to greater transparency and self
awareness and provide further avenues for debate on the
art and science of clinical communication.
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